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Multirelational k-Anonymity
Mehmet Ercan Nergiz, Christopher Clifton, Senior Member, IEEE, and Ahmet Erhan Nergiz
Abstract—k-Anonymity protects privacy by ensuring that data cannot be linked to a single individual. In a k-anonymous data set, any
identifying information occurs in at least k tuples. Much research has been done to modify a single-table data set to satisfy anonymity
constraints. This paper extends the definitions of k-anonymity to multiple relations and shows that previously proposed methodologies
either fail to protect privacy or overly reduce the utility of the data in a multiple relation setting. We also propose two new clustering
algorithms to achieve multirelational anonymity. Experiments show the effectiveness of the approach in terms of utility and efficiency.
Index Terms—Privacy, relational database, security, integrity, protection.
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1 INTRODUCTION
THE tension between the value of using personal data forresearch and concern over individual privacy is ever
increasing. Simply removing uniquely identifying informa-
tion (SSN, name) from data is not sufficient to prevent
identification because partially identifying information
(quasi-identifiers; age, sex, city . . . ) can still be mapped to
individuals using publicly available knowledge [23]. Table 2
shows one such example where an attacker, by using a
public data set, can map the names of the students to the
sensitive GPA information, even though the released
private table does not disclose the names of the students.
(For example, a student with age “18,” sex “M,” and city
“Lafayette” has a GPA of “2.34.” Luke is the only person
with these attributes in the public data set.)
k-Anonymity [20] is one technique to protect against the
linkage and identification of records. In a k-anonymous
table, each distinct tuple in the projection over quasi-
identifier attributes occurs at least k times. Private tables are
k-anonymized by the use of generalizations and suppres-
sions, with the result having two key properties: 1) In the
anonymous data set, an individual can only be linked to a
group of at least k private entities. 2) Every tuple of the
anonymous data set correctly represents a unique tuple in
the private data set (there is no false or noisy information).
For example, Table 2 shows a 2-anonymization of the above-
mentioned private table. Given the 2-anonymized table, an
attacker can at best link Luke into GPAs “3.72” and “2.34.”
k-Anonymity does not enforce diversity on the sensitive
information of equivalence classes (set of tuples with the
same identifying attributes in k-anonymous data set). This
has lead to extended privacy definitions [8], [16], [15], [18],
[25]. As many of the algorithms for these definitions are
rooted in k-anonymization algorithms, the multirelational
(multiR) k-anonymity approach presented here can serve as
a basis for extending other k-anonymity-based definitions to
multiple relations; one such extension is given in Section 5.
In the case where all sensitive attributes in the private table
are unique, k-anonymity does ensure that linkage will only
be possible to groups of k-distinct sensitive values.
To achieve k-anonymity in single-table data sets,
numerous generalization (replacing data values with more
general values) and suppression algorithms have been
proposed [21], [9], [10], [13], [3], [14], [2], [6], [19]. These
algorithms assume each private entity is stored as one row
in a single attribute-value table. When information about a
private entity is contained in multiple tables, and not easily
represented in a single table, the existing definitions and
algorithms are insufficient. In Section 2, this paper extends
the k-anonymity definitions to a multiR setting; Section 3
discusses why multiR k-anonymity is a new problem that is
not solved by previous k-anonymity algorithms.
Single dimensional k-anonymity algorithms were de-
signed to specify generalization mappings (or complete
suppression of values) for data values in the data set to
optimize against a certain metric. Some of such algorithms
used pruning methods to reduce the size of the search space
for optimal k-anonymity [13], [3]. However, in a multiR
anonymity setting, the search space is much bigger and
simple modifications will not be as efficient unless the
original optimality is sacrificed by using other assumptions.
In [19], [14], and [6], it was shown that although not
optimal, a multidimensional approach to k-anonymity can
offer more flexibility in anonymizations. Among this family
of algorithms, the clustering-based approach is more
suitable to the multiR setting due to the ease in explicit
identification of the entity being protected (anonymized) in
the data set. In Section 4, protected entities and associated
relations will be abstracted by trees and a modification of a
previously proposed clustering algorithm will be presented
to provide multiR anonymity on snowflake schemas; with
the aforementioned extension to ‘-diversity and related
approaches in Section 5. Section 6 will present experimental
results evaluating the new approach in terms of precision
and execution time.
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2 MULTIR ANONYMITY
2.1 Definitions and Notations
We now define notations and k-anonymity for the multiR
setting. Given a table T , T ½c½r refers to the value of
column c, row r of T . T ½c is the projection of column c.
Definition 1 (Person specific table). A table PT is said to be
person specific with respect to some population U if and only
if it contains a primary key attribute (or set of attributes) vip
such that each value of vip uniquely corresponds to an
individual in U .
Definition 2 (MultiR schema). A set of tables SU and a set of
functional dependencies SF corresponds to a multiR schema if
SU is a dependency preserving, lossless join decomposition
with respect to SF and there exists one person specific table
PT 2 SU , where each row corresponds to an individual in
population U . We say a database with such a schema has the
transcript MRðSF;U; PT ; ST ; vipÞ, where vip is the unique
identifier in PT and ST ¼ SU  fPTg.
Table 3 shows an example for a multiR database
with transcript MRðSF;U; Tp; fT1; T2g; SidÞ, where SF ¼
fSid! GPA; SCid! fSid;Course;Gradegg and U is the
set of students. The schema is in BCNF and depen-
dency preserving.
The following quasi-identifier definition is a reformula-
tion of the definition in [22].
Definition 3 (Quasi-identifier). Let MRðSF;U; PT ;
fT1; . . . ; Tng; vipÞ be a multiR database, and JT ¼ PT ffl
T1 ffl    ffl Tn. Let fc : U ! JT and fg : JT ! U 0, where
U  U 0. A quasi-identifier of MR, written QMR, is a subset of
attributes of JT , where 9pi2U such that fgðfcðpiÞ½QMRÞ¼pi,
and an adversary knows the values of QMR for pi.
Informally, a quasi-identifier for a schema is the set of
attributes in JT that can be used to externally link or
identify a given tuple in PT . In Table 3, Course and Book
attributes can be considered quasi-identifiers since
colleagues of a student may know this information about
their friend. The attributes GPA, Grade, and Price are the
sensitive attributes of the private entity Sid. An attacker
knows the quasi-identifiers about an entity and tries to
discover other (sensitive) information in the data. For
example, in Table 3, we assume the attacker knows that
some individual George in U takes the courses “History”
and “Religion” and uses the textbook “American History”
for the “History” course. The attacker wants to discover
George’s (sensitive) GPA or his grade in the “History”
course. If the data are released as it is, even though George’s
name is hidden, the attacker can easily link George to
student S4 and GPA “4.00” or SCid SC10 and grade “98.”
We also have other join keys in Table 3 like the vip attribute
Sid or SCid that are not part of the quasi-identifier set.
For the rest of this paper, we will use the notation
given in Table 1. From now on, if not mentioned
otherwise, we will use superscripts to name different
multiR databases (e.g., MR1;MR2; . . . ). Superscript for
other notations will show membership to the associated
multiR database (e.g., vip1 is the vip of MR1). We will use
superscript  for multiR anonymizations. Subscripts will
distinguish different elements of the same multiR database
(e.g., T 11 , T
1
2 2 ST 1 of MR1).
Definition 4 (Structurally equivalent). Two databases MR1
and MR2 have structurally equivalent schemas if and only if
vip1 ¼ vip2, PT 1 has the same set of attributes as PT 2, and
there exists bijective mapping between the set of tables ST 1
and ST 2 such that tables mapped have the same set of
attributes. Structurally equivalent schemas have the same
functional dependencies, population, QI, sensitive, and non-QI
joining attribute sets.
The multiR databases given in Tables 3 and 4 are an
example of structural equivalence.
We now define two operators that will be used in the
following sections for multiR databases.
Definition 5 (Union). For structurally equivalent MR1, MR2,
and MR[, MR[ (MR1 [MR2 if and only if PT[ ¼
PT 1[PT 2, ðT[j 2 ST[Þ ¼ ðT 1j 2 ST 1Þ [ ðT 2j 2 ST 2Þ.
Definition 6 (Concatenation). MRk (MR1kMR2 if and only
if PT k ¼ PT 1, ST k ¼ ST 1 [ fPT 2g [ ST 2, and vipk ¼ vip1.
Many different cost metrics were used in the literature
[10], [3], [19], [12] to measure utility of anonymized data sets.
We redefine two of these cost metrics, LM [10] and DM [3],
for the multiR setting, and use them in our experiments.
Different variations that may better fit to relational databases
can be formalized. (Discussion on such a formulation is
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TABLE 1
Notations for a Given Database MRi
TABLE 2
A Sample Public Table (University Registration Database), Private Table (University Alumni Database),
and an Anonymization of the Private Table, where k ¼ 2
beyond the scope of this paper.) Algorithms in the following
sections are independent of the cost metric being used and
discussions apply no matter what cost metric is being used.
Definition 7 (LM). Let fðvÞ be a function that given a
categorical [continuous] data cell value v returns the number
of distinct values [value interval þ1] that cell value stands for,
and gðattÞ be a function that returns the number of distinct
values [value range þ1] in from the domain of a given
categorical [continuous] attribute att. Assuming gðattÞ > 1,












jT j  jQIT j
:
LM metric can be defined on individual data cells. It
penalizes the value of each data cell in the anonymized data
set depending on how general it is (how many leaves are




51 .) LM for the multiR data set normalizes
the total cost to obtain a number between 0 and 1.
Definition 8 (DM). Let MR be an anonymization of MR and
let GMR ðvpÞ be the set of vip’s in MR indistinguishable from





As in the LM metric, the smaller the number returned by
the DM metric, the better the anonymization.
2.2 Problem Definition
Our objective is to find a k-anonymization of a given multiR
database. As the first step, we redefine k-anonymity for the
multiR setting.
Definition 9 (k-anonymity for multiR databases). Let MR
and MR be two multiR databases with the same set of
QI QMR and set of sensitive attributes SMR. We say MR

is a k-anonymization of MR if and only if 8vðJT Þ
(views on JT ):
1. anonymized: any query of the type attðvðJT ÞÞ
where att 2 SMR returns either zero tuples or at least
k (not necessarily distinct)1 tuples,
2. anonymized with respect to individuals: any query
of the type vipðvðJT ÞÞ returns either zero tuples or
at least k distinct tuples, and
3. correct: tuples in JT and JT  can be ordered such
that for all possible j, JT ½att½j is equal to or
some generalization of JT ½att½j if att 2 QMR and
JT ½att½j is equal to JT ½att½j if att 2 SMR.
The part “k not necessarily distinct tuples” in require-
ment 1 can be changed to “k distinct tuples” if we assume all
sensitive information in the MR is unique. MR and the
k-anonymous MR need not be structurally equivalent;
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TABLE 4
One Anonymization of Table 3, where k ¼ 2
1. k-anonymity allows sensitive attribute values to be the same over the
set of tuples with the same QI attributes. Other approaches like ‘-diversity
and t-closeness enforce constraints over the distribution of such groups of
sensitive values.
TABLE 3
Tp: Student Has GPA; T1: Student Takes Courses; T2: Books Bought by Student for Course
however, we will see that equivalence eases the anonymiza-
tion process and can improve utility of the data set.
The example in Table 3 is clearly not k-anonymous even
for k ¼ 2, as jSidðCourse¼ ‘‘History’’^Book¼ ‘‘Am:Hist’’ðJT ÞÞj ¼
jfS4gj ¼ 1. Table 4 shows a 2-anonymization of Table 3
using generalizations from the domain generalization
hierarchies given in Fig. 1; the same query on Table 4
returns no tuples.
The next theorem proves that due to requirement 2, the
different sets of vip tuples returned by queries in a given
multiR database act like disjoint groups of size at least k, and
queries are answered in terms of the groups. This notion of
groupings is analogous to equivalence classes in the original
k-anonymity definition. The theorem implicitly states that
disjoint grouping of vip’s is a necessary step for the multiR
anonymization process. We make use of this fact in
designing multiR algorithms in Sections 3.3 and 4.2.
Theorem 1. Let MR be a k-anonymous multiR database, where
ST ¼ fT1; . . . ; Tng and k  2. Then, for every vip value vp,
there exist some ‘  k 1 distinct vip values vp1; . . . ; vp‘
such that for every view v possible if vp 2 vipðvðJT ÞÞ,
then vp1; vp2; . . . ; vp‘ 2 vipðvðJT ÞÞ. We say the set Svp ¼
fvp; vp1; vp2; . . . ; vp‘g is the equivalence class of vp and write
ECMRðvpÞ ¼ Svp.
Proof. Suppose this is not the case and let the set of
views Vvp ¼ fvijvp 2 vipðviðJT ÞÞ. Since there are no
common k 1 vip values (other than vp) over all
views, then we have j \vi2Vvp vipðviðJT ÞÞj < k. Con-
structing the view v\¼\vi2Vvpvi gives jvipðv\ðJT ÞÞj	k
and vp 2 vipðv\ðJT ÞÞ, violating the k-anonymity con-
straint. This gives a contradiction. tu
The MR database in Table 4 has two equivalence classes:
fS1; S2g and fS3; S4g (e.g., ECMRðS1Þ ¼ fS1; S2g).
Theorem 1 can be modified for only sensitive attributes if
we have unique sensitive values. Every sensitive value s in
the data belongs to a set ECMRðsÞ of at least k sensitive
values such that if s is in a query result, then every element
in ECMRðsÞ is also in that query result (e.g., in Table 4,
ECMRð3:72Þ ¼ f3:72; 2:34g).
The k-anonymity definition for a multiR database is not
arbitrary. If an attacker faces the same set of private entities
in every possible set of queries, it can only map its external
knowledge to that set. Requirement 3 for k-anonymity
prevents false information being included in the anonymi-
zation of the original database. (Otherwise, there would be
trivial solutions for k-anonymization such as replication of
tuples. This requirement holds also for classical, single-table
k-anonymity, although it was not included explicitly in its
definition.) Note that the definitions and concepts given
here subsume the definitions of single-table k-anonymity.
In classical k-anonymity, we have one private table
PT ðA1; . . . ; AnÞ without any dependencies corresponding
to a population U . Since every tuple in PT belongs to an
individual, we can add a unique identifier attribute to PT to
form PTpðAu;A1; . . . ; AnÞ. PTp becomes a person specific
table with vip attribute Au. In that case, an anonymization
for MRðfAu ! fA1; . . . ; Angg; U; PTp; fg; AuÞ is also an




We now explore some obvious approaches to achieving
multiR anonymity using single-table k-anonymity algo-
rithms. The main idea is to convert the multiR database into
one or more single tables and anonymize these. For each
approach, we describe why it does not give satisfactory
results; the insights are useful in understanding the
algorithm we will give in Section 4.
3.1 Universal Anonymization
One solution might be to construct the universal relation
from the multiR database and run a single-table anonymiza-
tion algorithm on this relation. Table JT in Table 5 shows the
universal table for the database MRðSF;U; Tp; fT1g; SidÞ.
(The attribute SCid is removed, but this does not affect the
discussion.) To run an anonymity algorithm, we need to
identify the attributes that need to be modified. We have two
choices at this point. The first approach is to modify only the
quasi-identifier attributes (attribute Course in JT ) leaving
the others untouched. Data set AT1 in Table 5 is one possible
2-anonymization of JT . However, we see thatAT1 obviously
does not provide anonymity when an attacker knows all or
some of the courses taken by a student. For example, if an
attacker knows that Chris is taking History, Math, and
Physics, then it will map Chris to S1 since S1 is the only one
taking two science courses and a history course.
A second approach would be to modify join keys
(NDGH generalizations [19]) along with the quasi-identi-
fiers (e.g., attributes Course and Sid in JT ). Data set AT2 in
Table 5 is such a 2-anonymization of JT but still fails to
satisfy privacy constraints.
The main reason anonymization of a universal relation
fails is that multiple tuples belong to a single person and
the anonymization process does not take this into account.
It becomes possible that tuples belonging to the same
entity are anonymized with each other, making the relation
“k-anonymous” but failing to protect individual identity.
One way of resolving this would be to suppress all the
data in the joining attributes (e.g., Sid). However, in that
case, the data set would lose its relational structure and the
valuable information in the 1-N or N-N relations (e.g., the
information that a student taking Math, Physics, and
History has GPA 3.72 would be lost). This universal
approach also suffers from inference channels due to the
redundancy in representation when the adversary knows
functional dependencies for the schema, e.g., in AT2, given
Sid! GPA holds, the attacker will discover the third tuple
is actually Sid S1 since the first two tuples imply the
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Fig. 1. Course, book DGH structures.
student with GPA 2.71 is S1. A related work [27] worth
mentioning here was on checking k-anonymity on views
over a universal data set. The work was not based on table
generalizations and did not propose a k-anonymization
algorithm to create anonymous views.
3.2 Local Anonymization
Another way to anonymize the data set would be to
k-anonymize each table independently. The most basic
way of doing that is shown in T 1p and T
1
1 in Table 6. This
set of tables suffers from the same problems mentioned in
Section 3.1 (e.g., disclosure of Chris’s GPA).
A second approach again would be to use NDGH
generalizations on non-QI join keys as shown in T 2p and T
2
1 .
In this case, for this particular MR database, GPA informa-
tion seems to be 2-anonymous. However, sensitive Grade
information is not protected. The attacker will still be able to
map S1 to Chris and learn that he has received “93” and
“91” in two science courses (although not which course
each score belongs to). This is a violation of anonymity
requirement 2, since Chris is not anonymous with respect to
another student. Another downside of the approach is that
modifying join keys introduces many incorrect join paths,
decreasing the usability of the data.
The main reason why local anonymizations fail is that use
of independent and arbitrary mappings for generalization of
one table can create inference channels with respect to
mappings used by other tables. A multiR anonymity
algorithm should use consistent mappings throughout data
sets (e.g., by Theorem 1; if S1 and S2 are anonymized with
each other in one table, their courses should also be
anonymized with each other in the other table). Tables T 2p
andT 31 show a valid 2-anonymization that enforces consistent
mapping. Anonymization should also decide which map-
ping to use for anonymization. Clearly, a multiR anonymity
algorithm needs to view data globally to come up with close
mappings between private entities while maintaining preci-
sion and usefulness of the output data. The multiR
anonymity algorithm given in Section 4 will take all these
observations into account and give global decisions for
anonymization mappings.
3.3 Bitmap Anonymization
Some multiR databases can be converted to a Boolean
vector “bitmap” format with every private entity as a single
row and distinct attributes used to reflect different values.
Bitmap conversion is done by assigning the value “1” for
attributes that the private entity possess in the MR database.
Handling the other attributes that the entity does not possess
is done differently for different types of MR databases. In
complete databases, nonexisting tuples in the db (negative
tuples) implies that the individual does not possess the
corresponding attribute. Thus, nonexistent tuples also
constitute in the information content of the database (e.g.,
University Registration Database, Voters Database, . . . . In T1
in Table 3, S1 taking “Religion” course is missing implying
Chris definitely did not take the “Religion” course). In
bitmap versions of complete databases, “0” is used for
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TABLE 5
The Universal Table for Tp and T1 along with Two Anonymizations of It, where k ¼ 2
TABLE 6
Local Anonymizations for Tp and T1, where k ¼ 2
nonexistent attributes of the entities. On the other hand, in
incomplete databases, negative tuples imply uncertainty and
they do not add into the information content (e.g., hospital
databases, business databases that share customers,. . . .
Having a patient not having a particular disease in a hospital
database does not necessarily imply that patient did not
have the disease. It is always possible that full records of a
patient are contained in multiple hospitals). In bitmap
versions of incomplete databases, value “” is used for
nonexistent attributes of the entities to express uncertainty.
Table 7 shows the bitmap version of the complete MR
database given in Table 3 and its 2-anonymization. Classical
k-anonymity algorithms can be run on such data sets. The
anonymized data will then satisfy both multiR anonymity
requirements for certain types of relations; however,
1. not every multiR database is bitmap convertible.
Schemas containing tables that map one entity to
another entity an arbitrary number of times cannot
be converted to bitmap format without information
loss (e.g., a student taking n different Physics classes,
where n is arbitrarily large, cannot be readily
expressed. This is a serious drawback for data sets
that are updated frequently. Updates on certain
individuals can trigger changes in the schema of the
anonymized data set).
2. For incomplete databases, anonymization would
only be through suppression, as generalizing “S1 is
taking a Math course and S2 is taking a CS course”
into “S1 and S2 are both taking a Science course”
would correspond to merging columns in the schema
rather than generalization of data. So, anonymiza-
tions cannot take advantage of user-supplied gen-
eralization hierarchies or total ordering assumptions
for the attribute domains (for the sake of both
utilization and incorporating domain knowledge).
3. For complete databases, anonymizations would
additionally preserve common negative information
(e.g., “S3 is not taking a CS course and S4 is not
taking a CS course,” anonymization would preserve
“neither S3 nor S4 is taking a CS course”). However,
it is still impossible to incorporate domain knowl-
edge through generalization hierarchies or total
ordering assumptions (e.g., generalizing a student
taking “CS” with another student taking “Math” is
as costly as generalizing two students taking “CS”
and “Religion”, respectively, even though the former
could be a better generalization).
4. Suppression in the bitmap setting removes certainty
about the number of tuples corresponding to a given
entity (e.g., “S1 is taking a Math course and S2 is
taking a CS course” could safely be generalized into
“S1 and S2 are both taking at least one (“Science”)
course.” Bitmap anonymization would imply “S1
and S2 are taking two courses in total”).
5. Bitmap anonymizations do not consider possible
similarities of two private entities in the tail of a
nested relation. (For example, in the multiR database
in Table 3, S1 is taking a Math course and buys the
Discrete book for the course and S2 is taking a CS
course and buys the same book. Given that course
information is generalized (or suppressed), the book
information can safely be preserved without violat-
ing privacy. Bitmap anonymization would not retain
only the book information.)
6. Conversion to bitmap format produces data sets of
high dimensionality. Since distribution of produced
data points are skewed over the whole possible space,
this does not introduce further problems regarding
the curse of dimensionality. However, k-anonymity
algorithms do not take into account the existence of
“invalid points” (e.g., a point with Math-T:0, Math-
Di:1 would be an invalid point implying that the
student has not taken “Math” but used the “Discrete”
book for the “Math” course). Heuristics would need
to be used that would ignore invalid points to speed
up the anonymization.
7. Most real-world data are stored as relational tables
rather than bitmap tables. Conversion to such a
bitmap costs additional execution time and storage,
not to mention the cost of converting applications
designed for the original schema.
8. Many real-world relational databases contain corre-
lations within relations and this may make certain
heuristics for improving efficiency possible (e.g., a
student taking a “science” course is more likely to buy
a “science” or “math” book than a “religion” book. It
is possible to design fast and reasonably precise
algorithms that decide anonymizations only on
courses without considering book information). It
may be difficult to exploit such correlations without
considering the structure of the data. A single-table
k-anonymity algorithm on a bitmap database will be
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TABLE 7
Bitmap Version of MR without Some of the Sensitive Attributes and Its 2-Anonymization, Attribute T
in Each Course Shows Whether the Student Has Taken That Course or Not
This reduces the information loss in the anonymization to some degree.
unaware of the underlying structure and thus the
correlation.
4 CLUSTERING-BASED MULTIR ANONYMITY
We now develop a multiR anonymity algorithm that
overcomes the shortcomings of the approaches described
in the previous section, although it places certain (reason-
able) restrictions on the schemas supported. Algorithms for
arbitrary schemas are left as future work.
4.1 Assumptions and Properties
We aim to preserve certain properties of the database and,
in doing so, accept certain limitations on the databases that
can be anonymized by our algorithm. These properties and
assumptions are given here.
Schema preservation. The schemas of the input database
MR and the k-anonymous output MR will be structurally
equivalent (Definition 4).
Dependency preservation. The anonymized database
preserves functional dependencies of the original database,
so that
1. the semantics of the data are better preserved, and
2. inference attacks, by an adversary who knows a
functional dependency that fails to hold in the
anonymized data, are prevented.
We require that the schema be normalized to enforce
dependencies; this obviates the need to provide dependen-
cies separately as input to the anonymization algorithm.
Snowflake schema. The algorithm we present is limited
to schemas satisfying the following constraints:
1. No connection keys (primary/foreign keys) between
tables in MR are quasi-identifiers. (It is possible to
replace such quasi-identifiers with nonidentifying
keys to preserve connections.)
2. Every table in ST contains only one foreign key.
Table PT does not contain a foreign key.
3. We say a table T2 belongs to the family of T1 and
write T2 2 F ðT1Þ if T2 has a foreign key attribute,
which is a primary key attribute either in T1 or in
another family member of T1. We restrict ourselves
to schemas with F ðPT Þ ¼ ST .
Schemas with these constraints are similar to snowflake
relations where the fact table is the table PT (see Fig. 2),
although we do support one to many relationships between
PT and other tables. Any table in the schema can contain
sensitive attributes; anonymity constraint 1 will hold for all
of them. This family of schemas is expressive enough for
many database applications (XML, some spatiotemporal
databases, data warehouses, . . . ).
Join key atomicity. The algorithm presented in the next
section will preserve the atomicity of join keys. (The
assumption that join keys are not quasi-identifiers makes
it possible to follow this approach in all cases.) This ensures
one true join path as opposed to multiple paths (as in
fT 2p ; T 21 g in Table 6) in each connection and improves utility
of the anonymization (a query on the anonymized data set
is “true,” in the sense that the result is a generalization of
the result on the underlying data set).
4.2 MultIRelAtional CLustEring (MiRaCle)
Anonymization Algorithm
We now present a MiRaCle anonymization algorithm that
anonymizes a given multiR database under the assump-
tions given in the previous section. We first give a higher
level description of the algorithm to make the formal
explanation easy to follow.
4.2.1 Informal Description
MiRaCle is a clustering-based anonymity algorithm; any
distance-based clustering k-anonymity algorithm [6], [19],
[1] can be used as a basic skeleton for MiRaCle anonymiza-
tions. The main observation is that all clustering-based
anonymity algorithms make use of two basic operations on
private entities: anonymization and calculation of the
distance between two entities. The latter can be generally
defined as the cost of the anonymization of two entities. As
a sample basic skeleton, in the next section, we present a
trivial modification of CDGH clustering algorithm [19] for
MiRaCle. Here, we turn our attention to the real question:
How we anonymize two entities?
The assumptions given in the previous section enables us
to abstract entities of multiR databases as trees, where each
level of a given entity tree corresponds to levels of the
nested relation for a particular vip entity. (Fig. 3 gives an
example.) The challenge is to anonymize two trees of
similar structure with respect to each other.
Algorithm 1 anonymizeðtreeðs1Þ; treeðs2ÞÞ
Require: For a tree node s; treeðsÞ returns the tree rooted
from s and vs returns the QI attribute values associated
with node s. For two values of the same domain v1
and v2, genðv1; v2Þ returns the lowest cost generalization
of v1 and v2 with respect to a dgh.
1: vc1 , vc2 ¼ genðvc1 ; vc2Þ
2: let C1 be the set of child nodes of node s1
3: let C2 be the set of child nodes of node s2
4: find a low cost pairing of nodes in C1 and C2
5: for all matching pairs of nodes ðc1 2 C1; c2 2 C2Þ do
6: anonymizeðtreeðc1Þ; treeðc2ÞÞ
7: for all nodes c 2 ðC1 [ C2Þ unmatched do
8: suppress every value in nodes of treeðcÞ
Algorithm 1 shows how to anonymize two entity
trees. Anonymization occurs top-down. First, QI attributes
for tree roots are anonymized with each other. Each tree
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Fig. 2. Schema graph.
root has a set of child nodes. (In Fig. 3, children of
S1 and S2: C1¼f‘‘Math;’’ ‘‘Physics;’’ ‘‘History’’g, C2 ¼
f‘‘CS;’’ ‘‘Physics;’’ ‘‘Religion’’g.) The algorithm chooses
pairings of nodes between these sets to minimize the
local cost in the current level or the overall cost of
the anonymized trees. In Fig. 3, “Math” is paired with
“CS,” “Physics” with “Physics,” and “History” with
“Religion,” producing the set of nodes {“Science,”
“Physics,” “Social”, which is the least costly set in terms
of the cost metric used (e.g., LM), since each pair is
composed of two trees to be anonymized and the
function is called on the subtrees. (In Fig. 3, a second
call is made on ðtreeð‘‘Math’’Þ; treeð‘‘CS’’Þ.) “Math” and
“CS” values are changed to “Science” as a result of the
second call. Unpaired nodes are suppressed (e.g.,
node “Calc”).
4.2.2 Formal Description
We first show in Algorithm 2 how to modify the CDGH
clustering algorithm [19] to anonymize a given multiR
database. Each cluster has a representative that holds the
anonymization of the entities it contains. For each vip
value v, the algorithm finds, in line 5, a suitable cluster to
put v into. Suitability is measured by a distance function
dist, which we will define shortly. If there is no suitable
cluster, in line 7, v defines a new one. Then, in line 9, the
cluster representative of the closest cluster is updated to be
the anonymization of v and the former representative by
calling the function anon. When a cluster is full, the
identifying information in the tuples in the cluster (includ-
ing tuples linked to in other tables) is replaced with the
cluster representative; these generalized tuples are placed
into the anonymized database and the cluster is deleted. In
lines 13-20, leftover clusters are combined. Leftover tuples in
the last cluster ð< kÞ are suppressed.
Algorithm 2 MiRaCleðMR; k; th; climit; anon; dist; costÞ
Require: An input database MR with ST ¼ fT1; . . . ; Tng,
k constraint, a threshold value th, a cluster limit climit;
an anonymization function anon that can anonymize
two private entities;
a distance function dist that can calculate the distance
of two private entities;
a cost metric function cost defined over anonymized
MR databases;
We begin with an empty set of clusters C. vip vci is the
cluster representative of cluster ci, MRci is the database
that contains vci , and ECci holds the set of private
entities in ci.
Ensure: MR is a k-anonymization of MR
1: MR  null
2: for all vip value vj in PT do
3: if C is empty then
4: go to line 7
5: find i s.t. di ¼ distðvj; vci ;MR;MRciÞ is minimum
6: if ðdi > thÞ ^ ðjCj 	 climitÞ then
7: make a new cluster cnew, set cluster representative
vcnew¼vj, MRcnew¼MR, C¼C[fcnewg, ECci¼fvjg
8: go to step 2 to process the next vip in MR
9: MRci ¼ anonðvci ; vj;MRci ;MRÞ.
10: ECci ¼ ECci [ fvjg
11: if the number of elements in ci becomes more
than k then
12: MR ¼MR [MRci ; C ¼ C  ci (remove ci)
13: for all cluster ci left in C do
14: find j 6¼ i s.t. di ¼ distðvcj ; vci ;MRcj ;MRciÞ is
minimum.
15: MRci ¼ anonðvci ; vcj ;MRci ;MRcjÞ.
16: ECci ¼ ECci [ECcj ; C ¼ C  cj (remove cj)
17: if the number of elements in ci becomes more
than k then
18: C ¼ C  ci (remove ci); MR ¼MR [MRci
19: else
20: go to line 14 to find another suitable j.
21: MR now contains only one vip vi data for each
equivalence class, add the anonymizations for other
vip’s by using ECcj sets created in the process.
22: suppress the remaining vip’s in C and add to MR
23: return MR
As also mentioned in the previous section, the real
challenge is to define the distance between the two points
(e.g., private entities such as students). If we know how to
produce anonymizations of two points with respect to each
other, we can derive the distance between them by calculat-
ing the cost of their anonymization with respect to any
precision/cost metric. Here are formal details regarding how
MiRaCle defines the anonymization and distance functions
between two private entities (vip’s) v1 2MR1 and v2 2MR2:
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Fig. 3. Anonymization of students S1 and S2 from the sample MR database in Table 3.
anonðv1; v2;MR1;MR2Þ
¼ Anonymizeðvip1¼v1PT 1; vip2¼v2PT 2;MR1;MR2Þ
distðv1; v2;MR1;MR2Þ
¼ cost anonðv1; v2;MR1;MR2Þ
 
:
For each entity in the input MR db, MiRaCle makes one
call to function Anonymize per cluster representative. Since
the number of cluster representative is bounded by the
input parameter climit, MiRaCle calls AnonymizeOðclimit 
jMRjÞ times. The efficiency of the algorithm depends on the
efficiency of the Anonymize function.
Algorithm 3 Anonymizeðt1; t2;MR1;MR2Þ
Require: Tuple ti belongs to table PTi. All MRi are
structurally equivalent, function genðv1; v2Þ returns the
common parent of values v1, v2 on the dgh structure of
the associated domain.
Ensure: MR is an anonymization of t1 and t2
1: T  ( NULL
2: Let MR be a database with transcript ð; ; T ; fg; vip1Þ
3: for all atti of PT
1 do
4: if atti is a QI attribute then {Just anonymize}
5: T ½atti½1 ( genðt1½atti; t2½attiÞ
6: if atti is a non-QI nonkey or a foreign key
then {Copy}
7: T ½atti½1 ( t1½atti;
8: if atti is a primary key for a join with another table
then {Ensure anonymized across join}




atti is a foreign key do
10: Let MRjk be the database with transcript
f; ; T jk ; F ðT
j
kÞ; attig
11: MR (MRk AnonymizeSets
ðatti¼t1½attiT 1k ; atti¼t2½attiT 2k ;MR1k;MR2kÞ
12: T ½atti½1 ( t1½atti
13: return MR
Algorithm 4 AnonymizeSetsðC1 ¼ ft11; t12; . . . ; t1mg;
C2 ¼ ft21; t22; . . . ; t2ng;MR1;MR2Þ
Require: Sets of tuples Ci belongs to tables PTi. All MRi
are structurally equivalent. 1 	 m 	 n
Ensure: MR is a pairwise anonymization of C1 and C2
1: Let MR be an empty database, structurally equivalent
to MRi.
2: for all t1i 2 C1 do
3: for all t2j 2 C2 do
4: tempMRj ( Anonymizeðt1i ; t2j ;MR1;MR2Þ
5: costMRj ( costðtempMRjÞ
6: minCostj( arg minj costMRj
7: MR (MR [ tempMRminCostj
8: C2 ( C2  tminCostj
9: Suppress rest of the tuples in C2 and add them to PT 
10: return MR
Function “Anonymizeðt1; t2;MR1;MR2Þ” produces an
anonymization for two tuples t1 2 PT 1 and t2 2 PT 2.
(ti may be considered as a root node of a tree structure
stored in database MRi, e.g., Fig. 3.) The function classifies
and processes each attribute one by one. Processing of
primary key attributes is important since they serve as
connections to other tables. Attribute evaluation can be
summarized as follows:
. Lines 4-7: for nonkey attributes and foreign key
attributes, behave as in single-table anonymity:
anonymize QI attributes with respect to dgh struc-
tures, leave the rest (sensitive attributes and foreign
keys) as they are.
. Lines 8-12: for a primary key attribute att, find all
pairs of tables ðT 1k 2 ST 1; T 2k 2 ST 2Þ, where att is a
foreign key. We will have two sets of tuples
C1 ¼ ft11; . . . ; t1ng and C2 ¼ ft21; . . . ; t2mg in T 1k and T 2k ,
respectively, where each t1i ½att ¼ t1½att and each
t2i ½att ¼ t2½att. Call “anonymizeSetsðC1; C2; ; ; Þ” to
find suitable one-to-one matchings between t1i ’s and
t2j ’s. Suitability of a given matching depends on the
effect of the generalization on all of the connected
tables. (This is ensured by recursive calls to the
anonymization function in line 4.) Anonymize
matched tuples with each other, suppressing any
unmatched tuples.
Given sets of tuples C1 and C2 and assuming
n ¼ jC1j ¼ jC2j, there are Oðn!Þ possible pairwise matchings.
It is costly to search such a big space to find a cost optimal
matching. Because of this, algorithm anonymizeSets uses
the following matching heuristic. Each node in C1 is
matched optimally with a node in C2 one by one (e.g.,
t11 is matched with a tuple in C
2, then t12 is matched with
another,. . . ). This way, complexity reduces to Oðn2Þ pair-
wise matchings.
The algorithm can use any incremental cost metric that
can be defined on a database. For the experiments, we will
use the LM metric defined in Section 2.
Table 4 shows the output of MiRaCle on the MR input
given in Table 3 for k ¼ 2. vip S1 and S2 and vip S3 and S4
anonymized with each other. Fig. 3 shows how S1 and S2
are anonymized. The algorithm first ensures the tuples are
anonymous with respect to QI attributes. Since Tp does not
contain any QI attributes, no change is done (the root nodes
in Fig. 3). However, the primary key of Tp, Sid, occurs in T1
as a foreign key, so algorithm AnonymizeSets is called on
the sets of tuples sid¼‘‘S100T1 and sid¼‘‘S200T1 (the nodes on
the second level of the trees). A one-to-one matching of
tuples is done according to how costly the anonymization of
the matched tuples will be. Anonymization in this level also
takes into account table T2 (Books table), since T2 and T1
share SCid as a joining key. First, the “Math” node is
matched with the “CS” node since they can be anonymized
as “Science” and they have a common node in the third
level (in table T2). The “Physics” node is matched with
“Physics,” the anonymization here triggers a call of
AnonymizeSets on the sets of nodes {“Calc,” “Dyn”} and
{“Dyn”}. Node “Dyn” is matched with node “Dyn.” No
match is found for the node “Calc” so it is suppressed. The
last nodes in the second level are anonymized similarly.
If we take the function gen as the basic operation, function
anonymize (and thus the algorithm MiRaCle) turns out to be
expensive. Assuming n ¼ jC1j ¼ jC2j, for every call to
anonymizeSetsðC1; C2; ; Þ, Oðn2Þ generalizations are per-
formed. Note that the anonymize function (thus, function
anonymizeSets) is recursively called for every level in the
relation (roughly speaking for every table in the MR
database). Given that we have ‘ levels (tables) in MR, the
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complexity function is defined as fð‘Þ ¼ n2  fð‘ 1Þ. This
gives us a complexity of Oðn2‘Þ for function anonymize. So,
MiRaCle is an Oðclimit  jMRj  n2‘Þ algorithm.
In the worst case, n ¼ jC1j ¼ jC2j can be as large as half
of the size of the first table connected (e.g., T1 in Table 3).
This happens when we have two vip’s each connected to
exactly half of the tuples in the first table. However, in
practice, n is a small and generally bounded number (e.g.,
the maximum number of courses that can be taken by a
student is bounded by the number of available courses and
the work hours).
4.3 MiRaCle Extension: MiRaCleX
As mentioned in the previous sections, a multiR anonymi-
zation algorithm can make use of the relational structure of
the database to come up with more efficient heuristics. We
present one example of such a heuristic in this section.
The MiRaCle anonymization process given in Sec-
tion 4.2.2 considers the whole sibling subtrees when
deciding on a suitable matching of sibling nodes (in other
words, subtree matching is done rather than node matching).
This is an effective way of achieving an anonymization with
maximum precision. However, it is costly in terms of
execution time since the Anonymize function has to be
called for each potentially matched subtree pair (even for
pairs that are not matched at the end of the anonymization
process).
MiRaCle extension (MiRaCleX) makes use of the follow-
ing observation: If QI values for two root nodes are similar, then
QI values for their children are likely to be similar too. (If two
students are both taking “Math” course, it is probable that
they are both using a “Math” book.) This observation can be
generalized for most relational databases. (The tail of the
relations is correlated with the root of the relation.) An
algorithm may produce anonymizations with reasonable
precision much faster by just looking at the QI attribute
similarities of the upper level nodes of the relation and not
considering lower level nodes. Given this, pairing of sibling
nodes in the AnonymizeSets function of MiRaCleX can be
rewritten as in Algorithm 5. By this, the recursive call to the
Anonymize function is moved outside of the innermost loop
and the complexity function for function anonymize
becomes fð‘Þ ¼ n  fð‘ 1Þ þ n2. This gives us a complexity
of Oðn‘þ1Þ for function anonymize. So, MiRaCleX is an
Oðclimit  jMRj  n‘þ1Þ algorithm.
In Fig. 3, to find a matching between {“Math,” “Physics1,”
“History”} and {“CS,” “Physics2,” “Religion”} in the second
level, MiRaCleX Anonymize function only considers QI
attributes in the Course table T1, ignoring information in the
Books table T2. Once matching is done on the second level
(e.g., “Physics1” to “Physics2”), QI attributes in the Books
table specify the matching on the third level (e.g., a
matching between {“Calc,” “Dyn”} and {“Dyn”}).
The complexity of MiRaCleX can further be reduced by
using other heuristics. As an example, if the height of DGH
trees is smaller than n, the matching of tuples in
AnonymizeSetsX can be made more efficiently. Instead of
trying all possible pairings, level-by-level full-domain
generalization can be applied to each tuple in C1 and C2
and tuples with the same values are processed as matched
tuples [21]. Such an approach would result in a complexity
of Oðclimit  jMRj  h  n‘Þ, where h is the average height of
the DGH trees.
Algorithm 5 AnonymizeSetsXðC1 ¼ ft11; t12; . . . ; t1mg;
C2 ¼ ft21; t22; . . . ; t2ng;MR1;MR2Þ
Require: Sets of tuples Ci belongs to tables PTi. All MRi
are structurally equivalent. 1 	 m 	 n
Ensure: MR is a pairwise anonymization of C1 and C2
1: let MR be an empty database, structurally equivalent
to MRi.
2: for all t1i 2 C1 do
3: for all t2j 2 C2 do
4: for all attribute att of t1i do
5: if att is a QI attribute then
6: tj ½att ( genðt1i ½att; t2j ½attÞ
7: else
8: tj ½att ( t1i ½att
9: minCostj( arg minj costðtj Þ
10: tempMR( Anonymizeðt1i ; t2minCostj;MR1;MR2Þ
11: MR (MR [ tempMR
12: C2 ( C2  t2minCostj
13: suppress rest of the tuples in C2 and add them to PT 
14: return MR
4.4 Proof of k-Anonymity for MiRaCle
Anonymization Algorithm
Now, we prove that MiRaCle produces k-anonymous
databases.2 Since the algorithm preserves the structure of
the data and all changes are based on either generalizations
or suppressions, the third requirement for k-anonymity
trivially holds. The following theorems prove the first
requirement (sensitive information protection). The proof
for the second requirement is similar. Since k-anonymity
ensures total protection against sensitive information
disclosure only when sensitive information is unique for
every tuple, throughout the proof, we assume such
constraint is enforced in the data set and prove sensitive
information is k-anonymous in the output data set. We
assume the schemas satisfy the assumptions given in
Section 4.1.
We start by showing that anonymization of two private
entities is correctly carried out by the function Anonymize.
The function Anonymize given in Algorithm 3 produces
one representation of the anonymization as opposed to
multiple copies of it. For each equivalence class, copies are
produced from the representation at the end of MiRaCle
given in Algorithm 2. It is trivial to modify the function
Anonymize to output the necessary copies. The proofs
below will assume copies exist in the Anonymize output.
Since the algorithm structure is recursive, we first prove
the base case.
Lemma 2. Let MR1 and MR2 have structurally equivalent
schemas with STi ¼ fg. Let ti be a tuple in PTi. Then, function
“Anonymizeðt1; t2;MR1;MR2Þ” produces a 2-anonymization
for the tuples t1 and t2.
Proof. Since there are no tables connected to PTi,Anonymize
only applies basic generalizations to QI attributes of ti as
in the single-table k-anonymization process. This ensures
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2. Discussion also applies for MiRaCleX.
each QI in the two anonymized tuples is the same.
Therefore, any subset of the QI occurs in at least two
tuples; with no links to other tables, 2-anonymity holds.3tu
We now prove, in a bottom-up fashion, the recursive step
to prove that k-anonymity property is propagated through
connected tables: If we take a set of k-anonymous databases
and add another k-anonymous table where the join keys for
each set of private entities join (only) with an equivalence
class in the table, and vice versa, then the combined set of
tables is k-anonymous.
Lemma 3. Let MR1; . . . ;MRi; . . . ;MRt be t structurally
equivalent k-anonymous databases with set of sensitive
attributes S, QI attributes Q ¼ fqi1; . . . ; qilg, and a common
vip attribute vip. Suppose PTi’s contain a key pri. Let
ECMRiðpri0Þ return the set of pri values that belong to the
equivalence class of the pri value pri0 inMRi. Also, suppose for
any value pri0, ECMRaðpri0Þ ¼ ECMRbðpri0Þ if pri0 2 PTa,
PTb. That means equivalence classes of attribute pri are the
same in all MRi. Let ECMRðpri0Þ return this universal
equivalence class of pri0.
Let MRroot be another k-anonymous db with transcript
ð; ; T ; fg; priÞ. Suppose T has attributes ðpri; att1; . . . ; attm;
sen1; . . . ; sennÞ. By definition, pri is the primary key, attis
are QI attributes, and senj’s are sensitive attributes.
(Note that T should also be k-anonymous.) Also, suppose




iÞ is also k-anonymous.
As an example for Lemma 3, in Table 4, MR1 ¼
f; ; Course¼‘‘Science00T 1 ; fSCid¼SC1_SCid¼SC4T 2 g; SCidg, MR2¼
f; ; Course¼‘‘Physics00T 1 ; fSCid¼SC2_SCid¼SC5T 2 g; SCidg. T h e
pri attribute above corresponds to the attribute Sid and
MRroot ¼ f; ; T p ; fg; Sidg.
Proof. Suppose this is not the case and there exists a query
Q on the join JT where 0 < jsðQðJT ÞÞj < k for some
sensitive s, which is an attribute either in S or in table T .
We will look at each case separately. First, suppose s 2 S
and some s0 2 sðQðJT ÞÞ. This implies that there exists
at least one tuple tðpri¼p; att1m¼a1m; vip¼v; qi1‘¼
q1‘; s ¼ s0Þ 2 JT (otherwise, s0 has no connection with T
and we get a contradiction from the k-anonymity of the
MRi) and ðpri ¼ p; att1m ¼ a1mÞ 2 T . Now, suppose s0
occurs in MRa ð1 	 a 	 jÞ and ðvip ¼ v; pri ¼ p; s ¼ s0;
qi1‘¼q1‘Þ2JTa. Since MRa is k-anonymous, ðvip¼vj;
pri ¼ pj; s ¼ sj; qi1‘ ¼ q1‘Þ 2 JTa also holds, for every
pj 2 ECMRðpÞ and for distinct sj. By the definition of T ,
if ðpri¼p; att1m¼a1mÞ2T , ðpri¼pj; att1m¼a1mÞ2T
also holds for the same set of pjs. However, in that case,
ðpri¼ pj; att1m ¼ a1m; vip ¼ v; qi1‘¼q1‘; s ¼ sjÞ 2 JT .
This means we have at least k 1 other s values with the
same QI attributes as s0 (e.g., consider table Tp in Fig. 3,
p ¼ S1, and one MRa is the two generalization trees with
s ¼ 93, 78, respectively, and both rooted from “Science”
node with ECTpðS1Þ ¼ ECMRaðS1Þ ¼ fS1; S2g. As S1 is
connected to one tree, S2 is connected to the other. This
is true for all other MRa’s: two MR dbs rooted from
“Physics” and “Social” nodes, respectively. It is
impossible to distinguish S1 from S2 by using only QI
attributes). Then, if s0 2 sðQðJT ÞÞ, sj 2 sðQðJT ÞÞ
meaning jsðQðJT ÞÞj  k.
The proof is similar when s is an attribute from T .
Suppose again s0 2 sðQðJT ÞÞ and ðpri ¼ p; att1m ¼
a1m; vip ¼ v; qi1‘ ¼ q1‘; s ¼ s0Þ 2 JT . In this case, p
may occur in more than one MRa, but since equivalence
class of p is the same in each of them, discussion is still
valid. In this case, we have ðpri ¼ p; att1m ¼ a1m;
s¼s0Þ2T and ðvip¼v; pri¼p; qi1‘¼q1‘Þ2JTa. Since
MRa is k-anonymous, ðvip¼vj; pri¼pj; qi1‘¼q1‘Þ2
JTa also holds, for every pj 2 ECMRðpÞ. By the definition
of T , ðpri ¼ pj; s ¼ sj; att1m ¼ a1mÞ 2 T holds for the
same pj’s and distinct sj. Again, we will have ðvip ¼ vj;
pri¼pj; att1m¼a1m; qi1‘¼q1‘; s¼sjÞ2JT an d sj 2
sðQðJT ÞÞ. tu
Theorem 4. Let MR1 and MR2 have structurally equivalent
schemas with STi ¼ fT i1; . . . ; T ing and tuple ti 2 PTi.
Then, function “Anonymizeðt1; t2;MR1;MR2Þ” produces 2-
anonymization for the tuples t1 and t2 in some multiR dbMR.
Proof. Without loss of generality, suppose only T i1’s
directly join with PTi’s. In lines 4-7, the algorithm
first generalizes t1 and t2 with each other. This
provides 2-anonymity for t1 and t2 locally in PT . (If
we create an MR db for the anonymous t1 and t2, it
will refer to the 2-anonymous MRroot in Lemma 3.)
Next, in line 4 of the anonymizeSets algorithm, the
anonymization function is called on each pair of their
connections in T 11 and T
2
1 . (Databases returned from
these calls correspond to 2-anonymous MRa databases
of Lemma 3.) Returned anonymous dbs are first
merged in line 7 of anonymizeSets and then concate-
nated with the anonymous tuples in line 11 as in




are propagated through those tuples of T 11 and T
2
1
joined with t1 and t2, equivalence classes are explicitly
matched through the connected tables. The final output
is 2-anonymous by Lemma 3. tu
Theorem 5. MiRaCle, when given an input database MR
and appropriate parameters, produces a k-anonymous
database MR.
Proof. The skeleton of MiRaCle is a clustering-based
k-anonymity algorithm. The only change MiRaCle
introduces is to call Anonymizeðvip1¼v1PT 1; vip2¼v2PT 2;
MR1;MR2Þ lines 9 and 15 for the anonymization of two
private trees rooted at v1 and v2. Here, each private tree is
actually a cluster representative for multiple trees. Nodes
in each representative tree may have values from higher
domains in the given dgh structure (values such as
“Science,” “Social”). However, such difference does not
have any effect on the execution of the anonymize
function since the generalization function gen is also well
defined on higher domains ðgenð‘‘Science;’’ ‘‘Math’’Þ ¼
‘‘Science’’Þ. The MR database returned by the anonymi-
zation function will still be anonymous with respect to
both trees. Specifically, if v1 2MR1 and v2 2MR2 are m
and n anonymous vip representations, respectively, then
v3 2MR ¼ anonymizeðv1; v2;MR1;MR2Þ is an mþ n
anonymous representation. At the end of the MiRaCle
algorithm, every cluster C has more than k elements
and the associated cluster representative vC is a
jCj-anonymous representative. vC for each C is repro-
duced for every entity within C (so that they form
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3. The algorithm behaves exactly like CDGH anonymization algorithm
[19] in this case.
an equivalence class). This ensures k-anonymity. So,
Theorem 4 also implies the correctness of Theorem 5. tu
5 MIRACLE FOR ENFORCING DIVERSITY
Many extensions to k-anonymity have been proposed to
deal with a potential disclosure problem in the basic
definition: what if all individuals in a k-anonymized group
have the same value for a sensitive attribute [8], [16], [25],
[28], [15], [18]? We now briefly discuss how to extend the
multiR definition to diversity-enforcing definitions. While
we specifically address ‘-diversity [16], the discussion
applies to all of cited definitions except -presence [18];
it does not have a direct root in k-anonymity, and enforcing
-presence with a clustering-based anonymization algo-
rithm is a challenge left as future work.
5.1 Diversity-Enforcing MultiR Anonymization
As mentioned before, k-anonymity does not enforce any
constraint on the sensitive attributes within an equivalence
class. It has been shown that lack of diversity in sensitive
attributes makes linking attacks possible even though the
k-anonymity property is satisfied. Such issues have been
addressed with alternative privacy definitions [8], [15],
[16]. In these works, the k constraint on the equality group
size is replaced or supplemented with a constraint on the
distribution of the sensitive values within a group. With-
out loss of generality, we stick to the ‘-diversity definition:
a set of sensitive values is ‘-diverse if the entropy of the set
is more than logð‘Þ. We present an analogous multiR
anonymity definition that enforce ‘-diversity on the
sensitive attributes.
Definition 10 (‘-diversity for multiR databases). Let MR
and MR be two multiR databases with the same set of QI
QMR and set of sensitive attributes SMR. We say MR
 is an
‘-diverse anonymization of MR if and only if 8vðJT Þ (views
on JT ) the following properties hold:
1. diverse with respect to sensitive attributes: the
result set of any query of the type attðvðJT ÞÞ with
att 2 SMR respects ‘-diversity and
2. correct: tuples in JT and JT  can be ordered such
that for all possible j, JT ½att½j is equal to or some
generalization of JT ½att½j if att 2 QMR and
JT ½att½j is equal to JT ½att½j if att 2 SMR.
Anatomization [25], [28] is an alternative privacy pre-
serving technique to anonymization. The work in [25]
groups tuples by using an ‘-diversity algorithm and creates
(quasi-identifier preserving) anatomizations by binding the
sensitive values to groups instead of tuples. MultiR
anatomization can be produced from ‘-diverse multiR
anonymizations by using the same methodology.
We next show how to create ‘-diverse multiR
anonymizations.
5.2 Diversity-Enforcing MiRaCle
Modifying MiRaCle to diversity-enforcing privacy defini-
tions is not much different than modifying a clustering-
based k-anonymity algorithm to such definitions. Since we
know how to group and anonymize trajectories, we can
enforce any diversity constraint on the groups. ‘-Diversity
can be achieved by
1. applying a higher (or infinite) distance between the
vip’s with similar sensitive values as stated in [4],
2. using a bottom-up [top-down] hierarchical cluster-
ing approach (note that the methodology presented
in this paper is independent of the clustering
algorithm) and merge [partition] clusters until [only
if] diversity requirement is not violated, or
3. simply suppressing those clusters violating the
constraints. This approach has the advantage of
being resistant to minimality attacks [24] in an
anatomization setting. Minimality attacks exploit
the optimality (or suboptimality) property of a
given anonymization to link sensitive attributes to
individual vips.
In Algorithm 6, we present a bottom-up algorithm
dMiRaCle to enforce diversity. First, algorithm calls MiRa-
Cle to create groups of two vips, then continuously merges
groups violating ‘-diversity until the condition is satisfied.
Checking for ‘-diversity condition on a given equality
group G is easy. The set of sensitive values of each matched
data value needs to be ‘-diverse. Formally, ECGðsÞ should
satisfy ‘-diversity for all sensitive value s (e.g., in Fig. 3, the
set of sensitive values of the two science nodes needs to be
‘-diverse).
Note that algorithm is defined independently of the
anonymizer procedure, thus being applicable to any
clustering-based approach where the distance between
and anonymization of entities is well defined.
Algorithm 6 dMiRaCleðMR; ‘; th; climit; anon; dist; costÞ
Require: Same as in MiRaCle (Algorithm 2)
Ensure: MR is an ‘-diverse anonymization of MR
1: run MiRaCle with k ¼ 2. Let C and Cþ be the set of
clusters, where ‘-diversity is violated and not violated,
respectively.
2: repeat
3: let c 2 C be a cluster
4: let cclosest 2 C be the closest cluster to c
5: merge cclosest and c into cmerged.
6: if cmerged satisfies ‘-diversity then
7: Put cmerged in C
þ.
8: else
8: Put cmerged in C
.
9: C ¼ C  fc; cclosestg
10: until jCj 	 1
11: anonymize vip’s in each cluster of Cþ with respect to
ach other and put into MR
6 EXPERIMENTS
To compare the flexibility of MiRaCle, MiRaCleX, and the
single-table (bitmap) approach, we conducted experiments
on synthetic data structured as in Table 3.4 We created
1,000 random students; to each student, we assigned one
obligatory, two or three technical elective, and two or three
nontechnical electives from 22 courses. Each course had two,
three, or four textbooks to choose from. The distribution of
NERGIZ ET AL.: MULTIRELATIONAL k-ANONYMITY 1115
4. While a real database containing private data would be preferred, such
databases are, thankfully, hard to come by. We feel the synthetic database is
a more effective evaluation tool than a real database that does not contain
individually identifiable data.
courses and books to students was designed to match Bilkent
University’s undergraduate program requirements. We ran
MiRaCle and MiRaCleX on the original database and the
CDGH anonymization algorithm [19] on a bitmap transfor-
mation of the database. We fixed the cluster limit to be 150.
To evaluate the utility of the anonymizations, we used the
adaptations of the LM and DM cost metrics defined in
Section 2.
To observe how MiRaCle and MiRaCleX algorithms
address weaknesses given in items 2 and 5 of Section 3.3, we
first assumed that the data set is incomplete as described in
Section 3.3. In Fig. 4a, we graph the change in LM costs of
three anonymizations with respect to different k. Both
MiRaCle and MiRaCleX are 30-40 percent less costly than
the bitmap algorithm. Fig. 4b supports the same relation for
a fixed k ¼ 50 but with varying threshold (clustering input
parameter). Fig. 4c shows the DM costs for the algorithms.
MiRaCle and MiRaCleX slightly outperform the bitmap
algorithm on the DM metric.
We next conducted experiments assuming that the data
set is complete. LM is not a suitable metric for comparison
here since it does not take into account tuples that are not in
the data set. Fig. 5 shows the DM cost results. We see that all
three algorithms have similar costs and there is no obvious
winner. The MiRaCle algorithm loses its flexibility advan-
tage discussed in item 3 of Section 3.3. This is due to the fact
that entity anonymizations of MiRaCle are not optimal,
which means there are cases where bitmap approach is
better with respect to precision. However, in Fig. 6, we plot
the execution time required to run both algorithms on a 1.66-
GHz Intel Core Duo machine. Consistent with the discussion
in items 6 and 8 of Section 3.3, MiRaCleX outperforms both
algorithms by a factor of at least 3. (This is true even though
we ignored the time spent to convert the data set to the
bitmap format for bitmap anonymizations.) It should be
noted that execution times in all conducted experiments
show similar behavior. One important observation here is
that MiRaCleX has better or comparable utilization when
compared to MiRaCle and bitmap algorithms in all of the
experiments; however, MiRaCleX is much faster than both
algorithms. This implies that underlying heuristic works for
the experimental data set.
7 CONCLUSIONS
We have shown that in a full database setting, single-table
k-anonymity algorithms either fail to protect privacy or
overly reduce the utility of the data. We proposed a more
flexible anonymity algorithm for snowflake schemas.
Support for arbitrary schemas with multiple private entities
remains as future work.
Besides those mentioned in previous sections, there has
been other work on k-anonymization of data sets: With
regard to privacy problems related to k-anonymity, the
works in [8] and [16] pointed out possible sensitive
information disclosure due to lack of diversity on class
values of equivalence classes and privacy was further
enhanced by enforcing diversity on the class values. The
work in [15] mentioned that privacy provided in equivalence
classes should be measured in terms of deviation from
original distribution of class values and enforced diversity
on class values relative to their original distribution in the
original data set. The work in [25] pointed out that if the sole
purpose for anonymization is to protect against sensitive
information disclosure, maximum utilization can be
achieved by applying permutations on the sensitive values
instead of quasi-identifiers. The work in [18] presented a
risk-based privacy notion, where risk is from disclosing the
existence of individuals in released data sets.
In [11] and [29], anonymity was achieved in a distributed
system by the use of secure multiparty computations. In
[26], privacy requirements for anonymizations were
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Fig. 5. DM cost for complete data.
Fig. 4. Incomplete data. (a) LM cost for varying k. (b) LM cost for varying threshold. (c) DM cost for varying k.
Fig. 6. Execution time.
personalized based on individuals’ preferences on sensitive
attributes. With regard to utilization of anonymized data
sets, in [2], an application-specific single dimensional
k-anonymity algorithm was proposed that makes use of
heuristics regarding information gain to optimize the output
for classification. The work in [12] discussed releasing
marginal count tables along with anonymizations to in-
crease utilization without violating k-anonymity privacy
constraints. The work in [24] showed that optimality with
respect to a cost metric can be exploited to recover sensitive
attributes from an anatomization. And recently, there has
been several works on modeling adversary background
knowledge in a variety of privacy settings [17], [5], [7].
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